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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PENN HARRIS SMITH, 
MARY ANNE SMITH, and 
E.P.S. DEVELOPMENT, a Utah partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
RICHARD H. TYLER, INA W. TYLER, and 
RUSSELL J. LIMB, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
Case No. 970176-CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The power to hear and decide this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by 
provision of Utah Constitution, art. VIII, §§ 3 and 5, and Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2(3)0, 78-2-2(4), 
and 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS 
On appeal from a summary judgment, the facts and any inferences arising therefrom 
are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Chapman v. Primary Children's 
Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181,1182-83 (Utah 1989). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
The issues on this appeal are all presented as questions of law because the factual 
issues are theoretically undisputed. Even the question of whether there are any genuine issues of 
material fact, which preclude summary judgment, is an issue of law because those facts which must 
be proved in order to make out a claim or defense are established by law. The issues presented by 
this appeal were raised in and considered by the district court. R 539-59, 590-614, 621-32, 650-77, 
697-706, 745-72. They include the following: 
1. Did the district court err in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material 
fact which would preclude summary judgment? 
2. Was plaintiffs' possession and use of the subject real property insufficient as a matter 
of law to place the world on inquiry as to any interest plaintiffs claimed therein? 
3. Did the public record put defendant Limb on constructive notice of plaintiffs' 
interest in the subject real property or any part thereof? 
4. Was plaintiffs' interest in the subject real property extinguished by post-default 
agreements? 
5. Did the district court err in considering issues relating to the existence, terms, or 
enforceability of the August 19 agreement on defendants' motions for summary judgment? 
6. Did Smiths and Tylers reach an agreement on August 19, 1991, and if so, what 
were the terms thereof? 
7. If plaintiffs and defendants Tyler did not reach an agreement on August 19, 1991, 
or if such agreement is unenforceable, could plaintiffs' interest in the subject real property have been 
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extinguished by plaintiffs' attempt to negotiate such an agreement or by entering into an 
unenforceable agreement? 
8. Are plaintiffs estopped to assert any interest in the subject real property? 
9. Have plaintiffs waived the right to assert an interest in the subject real property? 
10. Did the district court err in considering defendant Limb's motion to dismiss after 
the court had granted Limb the relief he had sought in the alternative to the dismissal? 
11. Did Limb have standing to assert any position in the remaining litigation after the 
order claim against him had been certified for immediate appeal? 
12. Did the district court abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs' third cause of 
action for failure to prosecute where it appears that the parties were still engaged in settlement 
negotiations, as the result of which neither plaintiffs nor defendants Tyler requested a trial setting? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
There is no constitutional provision, statute, or rule which plaintiffs consider to be 
controlling. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from multiple orders of the Fifth Judicial District Court which 
(1) granted defendants partial summary judgment quieting title to certain real property against 
plaintiffs, (2) dismissed plaintiffs' two claims for money damages, and (3) denied plaintiffs' motion 
to set aside the order which dismissed the second of the damages claims. Plaintiffs' appeal to the 
supreme court was poured over to the court of appeals. 
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Proceedings in the Lower Court. Plaintiffs initiated a complaint pro se seeking damages sustained 
by the fact and manner of Tylers' sale of certain real property. R 1-2. Later, through counsel, 
plaintiffs amended their complaint to assert their unforeclosed equity of redemption in the above-
mentioned real property and, in the alternative, to assert a claim for breach of contract. R 382-94. 
Defendants moved for and were granted summary judgment against plaintiffs on the first cause of 
action, quieting title in favor of defendant Limb who had purchased the subject real property from 
defendants Tyler. R 539-59, 590-96, 660-75. Although defendants' motions did not address it, the 
district court also dismissed plaintiffs' second cause of action. R 674. Later, defendant Limb moved 
the court to dismiss plaintiffs' third cause of action by which plaintiffs sought damages against 
defendants Tyler representing unpaid compensation owed in connection the transfer of certain water 
rights. Limb's motion alleged that plaintiffs had failed to pursue their third cause of action after 
defendants had been granted partial summary judgment. Limb moved the court, in the alternative, 
to certify the partial summary judgment which had been entered earlier as a final order under Utah 
R.Civ.P. 54(b). R 697-704. 
Disposition in the Lower Court. The district court ultimately dismissed all three causes of action: 
the first, on the merits; the second, for reasons which the court never articulated; and the third, for 
failure to prosecute. Finally, the district court denied plaintiffs' motion to set aside the order which 
dismissed the third cause of action. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
In two separate transactions, plaintiffs borrowed a total of $56,500 from defendants 
Tyler. R 544. As security for the repayment of these loans, plaintiffs and others, at plaintiffs' 
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instruction or request, conveyed to Tylers the title to four parcels of lands by deeds, which were 
absolute on their faces. R 544-45. Plaintiffs contend that these properties had a combined fair market 
value of approximately $161,000.00. R 915-17. 
Plaintiffs and Tylers executed certain documents which acknowledged that the real 
property had been conveyed to Tylers as security for the repayment of the above-mentioned loans. 
R 544-45. A memorandum describing three of these parcels was recorded in the office of the 
Washington County Recorder at the request of Security Title Company. R 545, 890. Plaintiffs 
retained the right of possession of all four parcels and stored miscellaneous items of personal property 
on the parcel which was not described in the recorded memorandum. R 1199-1200. 
Plaintiffs failed to repay the loan obligation according to its terms and sought 
protection in bankruptcy. R 546, 922. Plaintiffs' bankruptcy attorney listed plaintiffs' equity in the 
subject real property as an asset of the bankrupt's estate. R 546, 901. Notwithstanding the fact that 
plaintiffs were in bankruptcy, Tylers continued to press plaintiffs for payment of the obligation or 
release of the real estate. R 546, 920. Through bankruptcy counsel, plaintiffs negotiated an 
agreement with Tylers which was signed on June 13, 1990. R 546-47, 895-97. Under the terms of 
that agreement, plaintiffs and Tylers were to jointly list the subject property and any proceeds from 
the sales thereof were to be applied first to the discharge of any obligation owed Tylers and "the 
remaining proceeds and unsold property shall be delivered to and/or conveyed to Debtors 
[plaintiffs]." R 897. The agreement further provided that if the property had not been sold and or 
Tylers had not been otherwise satisfied by March 1992, plaintiffs would withdraw any claim they had 
to the subject property. R 897. The bankruptcy court approved the stipulation by written order. 
R 898-900. 
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Nevertheless, Tylers continued to remind plaintiffs that they were in default and that 
Tylers considered the subject property theirs, contending that they had been damaged by its wrongful 
inclusion in the bankruptcy proceedings. R 1040-41, 1121 -26, 1230-31. Insisting that the property 
be released from the bankruptcy and any stipulation connecting it thereto, Tylers prepared a letter for 
plaintiffs'signatures. R 1040-42, 1132-34, 1213-1217, 1228-29, 1269. See Addendum. The letter 
stated that plaintiffs "knew the properties rightfully belonged to the Tylers but upon the suggestion 
by the lawyer [plaintiffs] entered them in the bankruptcy." Tylers' draft of the letter went on to say: 
"[Plaintiffs] now believe that the advice we received from [plaintiffs' bankruptcy attorney] to include 
the Tylers property in our Bankruptcy was bad advice and that they should be released to the Tyler's 
as they really owned them and have for about a year before the original filing of the chapter 11." R 
1269 [sic]. 
Out of a desire to accommodate Tylers and based upon Tylers' assurances that Tylers 
would continue to recognize plaintiffs' equity if the property were released from the bankruptcy, 
plaintiffs revised the letter drafted by Tylers and mailed the revised letter to the bankruptcy trustee 
on or about February 11, 1991. R901, 1040-41, 1219-20. See Addendum. 
The events of August 19, 1991, are the subject of considerable controversy. Plaintiffs 
contend that on that date defendant Richard Tyler advised plaintiff Penn Smith that Tyler had located 
a purchaser for the property who would be willing to purchase the real estate if certain water rights 
which plaintiffs owned were included as a Part of the proposed transaction. R 549-50. Plaintiffs 
agreed that they would relinquish their claim to the subject real property in order to facilitate the sale 
to Tylers' purchaser and Tylers agreed to pay plaintiffs the sum of $20,000 for plaintiffs' equity in the 
real property and $20,000 for the water rights. R 549-50, 1038, 1084, 1226. 
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Tylers, on the other hand, concede that when they entered into the agreement with 
plaintiffs to get the real property out of bankruptcy and sell it, plaintiffs were to receive all of "the 
overage," the proceeds of any sale or sales after payment of the costs of any sales and payment of 
plaintiffs' promissory notes which Tylers still held. R 1219-20. But when defendant Richard Tyler 
and plaintiff Penn Smith were discussing the proposed sale during their August 19 meeting, Tyler 
claims that Smith "kept telling me that for 10,000 that would satisfy him." R 1228. Tyler claims that 
"this 20,000 is an elevated figure." Id Moreover, Tylers attempt to sidestep the question of 
whether or not they agreed to pay for the subject water rights. Mr. Tyler suggested that the water 
rights were transferred in order to eliminate an obstacle to the sale of the real property which may be 
created as a result of plaintiffs' continuing legal right to enter one the parcels to maintain the spring 
and the water distribution facilities. R 1228. Ultimately, however, it was obvious that Tylers had no 
intention of paying for the water rights because they believed that plaintiffs had "fooled" them by not 
having included the water rights as part of their collateral security from the beginning. R 1227. 
However, the most fundamental and serious controversies concerning the agreement of August 19, 
1991, relate to time and order of performances. 
Plaintiffs had obviously been concerned with pursuing a coarse of action which would 
maximize the price the sale of the subject's real property would bring when exposed to the market. 
That concern was reflected in the terms of the stipulation which had been executed on June 13, 1990. 
R 895-97. The agreement of August 19, 1991, served to shift the concern about getting the best 
price for the property to Tylers who would under this agreement be entitled to any proceeds from the 
sale of the property over and above the sum certain which plaintiffs had agreed to accept as 
compensation for their equity in the land and the transfer of the water rights. Nevertheless, 
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defendant Richard Tyler marketed the property without any concern whatsoever that the sale thereof 
be made at any where near the fair market value of the property. 
Defendants Tyler had merely placed "for sale" signs on the property. R 1233-35. No 
realtor was involved in the sale to Limb. Moreover, once Limb had indicated an interest in the 
property, Tyler made it abundantly clear that he was willing to sacrifice the property and, according 
to Limb: "Mr. Tyler kept offering me a better price, you know, it became more enticing." R 1152. 
It was Tyler who initiated virtually all of the telephone conversations between himself and Limb. 
Tyler was only interested in selling all four parcels in a single transaction. On the other hand, Limb 
had no real interest whatsoever in acquiring two of these parcels. Finally, Tyler made Limb an offer 
he could not refuse, assuming that he could place the entire burden of the sacrifice upon the plaintiffs. 
R 1152-54. 
At about the same time - on or near August 19, 1991 — Tylers submitted a written 
request for abandonment, together with a form of a notice of abandonment to the bankruptcy trustee 
for his signature. These documents were prepared by Tylers' friend, St. George attorney J. 
MacArthur Wright. R 548, 911-13, 1204-06. Tylers' request for abandonment stated that the subject 
property had been deeded to creditors for value prior to the filing of bankruptcy and that the debtors 
should not have listed it as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. R 912-13. On August 23, 1991, the 
trustee signed the notice of abandonment, using Wright's form which stated. " . . . I have found the 
above listed property to not belong to the debtor, not be a part of the bankruptcy estate, therefore, 
burdensome to the estate, and of inconsequential or no value to the estate." R 913. The executed 
notice of abandonment was apparently sent directly to Tylers who took it to Security Title Company 
in order to seek advice and have the document recorded. R 645, 911. 
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On or about September 16, 1991, Tylers deeded the subject real property to defendant 
Limb and had Security Title Company record the notice of abandonment. R 549-51. Tylers never 
told plaintiffs that the transaction had in fact closed. Thereafter, plaintiff Penn Smith contacted 
defendant Richard Tyler asking if the property should be re-listed with a realtor. Tyler told Smith to 
go ahead and list the property, apparently attempting to conceal the fact that Tylers had already 
conveyed the property. R 1097, 1240. At about that same time, plaintiffs' bankruptcy case was 
dismissed. R 1309. 
Plaintiffs later discovered that the real property and water rights had been conveyed 
to defendant Limb. They then initiated this action, without the assistance of counsel, alleging that 
Tylers had breached the agreements relating to the sale of the subject property. R 1-2. 
After retaining counsel, plaintiffs amended their complaint to seek enforcement of the 
August 19 agreement alleging that, in the event the court should determine that no agreement had 
been reached or that such agreement was not enforceable, plaintiffs' equity of redemption in the 
subject real property had not been foreclosed or otherwise extinguished. Plaintiffs also asserted a 
claim for the value of the above-mentioned water rights. R 382-94. 
Tylers answered the second amended complaint denying the allegations concerning 
the August 19 agreement and further denying that plaintiffs had any interest in the real property. R 
403-07. Limb answered and moved for summary judgment contending (1) that he had given value 
for the property in good faith and without notice, actual or constructive, of any interest which 
plaintiffs claimed in the property; (2) that plaintiffs were estopped to claim any interest in the property 
by reason of the February 11, 1991, letter to the bankruptcy trustee; and (3) that plaintiffs had 
relinquished their interest in the subject property by virtue of the June 13, 1990, bankruptcy 
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stipulation and by virtue of the alleged, but contested, agreement of August 19, 1991. R 397-402, 
539-59. Tylers joined in Limb's motion and further alleged that plaintiffs had waived any interest in 
the subject real property. R 590-96. 
The district court agreed with Limb and Tylers on all points and on May 2, 1995, 
orders were entered dismissing plaintiffs' first and second causes of action. R 660-75. See 
Addendum. Plaintiffs' contract claim relating to the conveyance of water rights remained 
outstanding. R674. 
Plaintiffs appealed the partial summary judgment to the Utah Supreme Court, 
attempted to have the judgment certified under Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b), and asked the court to treat the 
notice of appeal and supporting pleadings as a petition for interlocutory appeal if the direct appeal 
were deemed premature. R 678-79, 754-55. Limb moved for summary disposition arguing that the 
judgment was not final and had not been certified for immediate appeal. R 755, 764. Plaintiffs' 
appeal was dismissed and the case was remitted to the district court in November 1995. R 695-96. 
During the pendency of the appeal and continuing thereafter, plaintiffs' attorney was 
engaged in ongoing settlement negotiations with Tylers' attorney, Craig Dunlap of Hughes and Read. 
R 755-56. These parties were attempting to reach a comprehensive settlement of all claims, including 
those which had been summarily dismissed. R 755-57. According to Dunlap, all the defendants, as 
well as Security Title Company,1 had agreed to contribute to the settlement fund if the parties could 
come to terms with plaintiffs. R 757. In March 1996, Mr. Dunlap left the firm of Hughes and Read 
Tylers initiated a third-party complaint against Security Title Company alleging 
negligence and other miscarriages in the discharge of the title company's duties allegedly owed 
Tylers. R 414-19. The third-party complaint was dismissed on Security Title's motion for 
summary judgment. R 685-91. 
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and relocated in Salt Lake County. Tylers' case was reassigned intra-office to Michael D. Hughes.2 
R 755-56. 
Plaintiffs' attorney thereafter contacted Mr. Hughes on at least two occasions to see 
if Tylers had responded to plaintiffs' counter to defendants' most recent settlement proposal. R 756. 
Within a few days of the second of these contacts, Limb moved the court to certify the partial 
summary judgment which had been entered in the above-entitled matter on May 2, 1995. R 697, 704, 
756. Limb had apparently only recently realized that plaintiffs' notice of lis pendens would continue 
to cloud title until the case was finally resolved. Limb now sought to facilitate the appeal he had 
earlier moved to dismiss. 
Limb's motion actually sought the dismissal of plaintiffs' third and only remaining cause 
as the relief requested and asked the district court for the Rule 54(b) certification in the alternative. 
The continuing pendency precluded an immediate appeal from the partial summary judgment. 
Through counsel, Limb alleged that "[s]ince the court granted summary judgment in favor of 
defendant Limb in April of 1995, Plaintiffs have taken no action to pursue this case." R 702. 
Plaintiffs did not resist the Rule 54(b) certification but opposed the dismissal of the pending claim. 
R 705-06. 
On the evening of September 22, 1996, plaintiffs' attorney contacted Mr. Hughes 
concerning the upcoming hearing. Hughes stated that Tylers would not join in or argue the motion 
to dismiss. Hughes said that in his opinion it was obvious that the court would deny the motion. He 
suggested that counsel meet together with their clients and discuss settlement after the hearing. 
2Tylers retained Dixon & Truman after the case was the court of appeals and therefore 
members of that firm had no involvement in proceedings in the district court or in the settlement 
negotiations conducted while the case was pending in the lower court. 
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Plaintiffs' attorney was scheduled to be in Manti, Utah, on the afternoon of September 23, and asked 
Mr. Hughes to again communicate plaintiffs' counter proposal to his clients as Tylers had not yet 
made any response to it. R 756. 
On September 23, Mr. Douglas Terry appeared at the motion hearing for plaintiffs' 
attorney and advised the court that plaintiffs did not resist the Rule 54(b) certification. R 715, 756. 
The district court certified the partial summary judgment thus facilitating an appeal from the partial 
summary judgment. R 715, 732. 
After the judgment had been certified, Limb was allowed to pursue his motion to 
dismiss notwithstanding the fact that dismissal and certification had been sought alternatively. In so 
doing, Limb took advantage of the district court's impression that there had been virtually no activity 
in the case since May 1995. R 715. Neither of the attorneys for the defendants advised the court of 
the ongoing efforts to settle the lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs' attorney had not provided Mr. Terry with a complete briefing of the history 
of the case because counsel assumed that Limb would have no standing to pursue the motion to 
dismiss once the partial summary judgment was certified for appeal. Limb was not a party to the 
dispute which was still pending in the district court. 
The district court found that partial summary judgment was entered in May 1995 and 
that since that time "nothing further has been done on this case." R 715. The court ordered plaintiffs' 
third cause of action dismissed for failure to prosecute. R 732. Plaintiffs moved the court for an 
order pursuant to the provisions of Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b) setting aside the judgment of dismissal. R 
726-29. That motion was denied. R 785-87 
Plaintiffs have appealed all adverse rulings. R 773-74, 792-93. 
12 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs possess an unforeclosed equity of redemption in certain real property located 
in Washington County. Plaintiffs have done nothing which would estop them from asserting this 
equity, nor have they waived it. Plaintiffs did enter into certain post-default agreements designed to 
facilitate the sale of the property and the distribution of the proceeds therefrom. However, none of 
these agreements called for or resulted in the immediate relinquishment of plaintiffs' equity in the 
subject real property and plaintiffs are guilty of nothing which would deny them the right to continue 
to assert their equity against any intervening third party, including defendant Limb. 
The district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' second cause of action by which 
plaintiffs alleged, in the alternative, that they were entitled to money damages as a result of Tylers' 
contractual breaches. Defendants' motions for summary judgment had not raised the viability of the 
second cause of action, the issue was not briefed, and the district court has not articulated any basis 
for its order dismissing the same. 
The district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' third cause of action for failure to 
prosecute. The motion to dismiss had been framed in the alternative and defendant Limb had been 
granted alternative relief. At that point, there was no basis for proceeding further and granting 
additional "relief which had been requested only as an alternative measure. 
Finally, the district court erred in refusing to set the order of dismissal aside once the 
district court was made aware of the fact that measures had been taken and were still underway to 
resolve the controversy through compromise and settlement as well as plaintiffs, had not requested 
a trial setting or done anything else to advance the case as a piece of litigation because all parties were 
apparently hopeful that a settlement would be reached. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS RETAINED AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT 
REAL PROPERTY WHICH INTEREST HAS NOT BEEN 
EXTINGUISHED THROUGH STATUTORY FORECLOSURE 
PROCEEDINGS. 
A deed, absolute on its face, may nonetheless operate as a mortgage if the parties 
thereto intend such an operation and effect See Kjar v. Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 
(1972); WillardM. Milne Inv. Co. v. Cox, 580 P.2d 607 (Utah 1978). See generally, Restatement 
Third, Property (Mortgages) § 3.2 (parol evidence admissible to establish deed absolute was intended 
as security). 
In the instant case, the intent that the deed operates as a mortgage is expressed in a 
document that was and made a matter of public record. See R 890. This was a recordable document 
and accordingly, put the entire world on notice of plaintiffs' continuing interest in three of the four 
parcels of the subject real property. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-1(1), 57-3-2(1), and 57-4a-2. 
Tylers are bound by all of the above-mentioned documents and have not advanced any serious 
argument to the contrary. 
At common law, plaintiffs' interest in the real property would have been extinguished 
when they were unable to repay Tylers on "law day," the day payment was due. See Restatement 
Third, Property (Mortgages) §3.1, comment a. Equity abhors a forfeiture and intervened with an 
equity of redemption (see id) which became so firmly rooted in English and American jurisprudence 
that it was the money lenders who had to resort to the body politic for relief—legislation which 
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created a means by which this equity could be extinguished. See id. See also Dan B. Dobbs, 
Remedies at 38-40; 59 C.J.S., Mortgages §§ 1, 813-822. 
This "equity of redemption" is recognized as estate in land. See Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue v. Freihofer, 102 F.2d 787 (3rd Cir.1939). It has become as much a part of 
American jurisprudence that a contract, regardless of its express terms, cannot effectively extinguish 
a purchaser's or borrower's interest in real property pledged as security for the payment of the 
purchase price or the repayment of a loan obligation without complying with a statutory mortgage 
foreclosure procedure which extends to the borrower a statutory right of redemption. See 
Restatement Third, Property (Mortgages) § 3.1(b), (c). Cf Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-37-1 etseq. 
Although Tylers clearly intended the conveyance of the subject real property to serve 
as a means of securing the repayment of money they had lent plaintiffs, Tylers never initiated 
proceedings to foreclose plaintiffs' equity therein. See Restatement Third, Property (Mortgages) § 
3.1(a)(right to redeem real property continues until mortgage is foreclosed). 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ESTOPPED TO ASSERT AND HAVE 
NOT WAIVED THEIR INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT REAL 
PROPERTY. 
After plaintiffs sought protection in bankruptcy, the automatic stay did not stop Tylers 
from continually contacting them seeking release of the subject property from the bankruptcy 
proceedings. R 1040-41, 1121-1126, 1230-31. On or about February 9, 1991, Mr. Tyler approached 
plaintiffs with a draft of a letter which he wanted them to send to the bankruptcy trustee asking that 
the property be released from bankruptcy. R 1040-42, 1132-34, 1213-1217, 1228-29. Plaintiff Penn 
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Smith rewrote Tyler's letter making few changes.3 R 901, 1041, 1269. In the letter, plaintiffs 
expressed a legal opinion to the effect that inasmuch as they had defaulted in the payment of their 
obligations to Tylers, they had forfeited their interest in the subject property. They then blamed their 
having made any claim to the property on the fact that they had received bad legal advice from their 
bankruptcy lawyer. R 901. All the while, Tylers assured plaintiffs that if the property were released 
from the bankruptcy proceedings, Tylers would continue to recognize plaintiffs' interest in the 
property. R 1040-41, 1219-20. 
Plaintiffs' statements constitute nothing more than a layman's expression of a legal 
opinion. An estoppel does not arise from a statement which represents a mistake of law on the part 
of the declarant. Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312, 14 S.Ct. 99, 137 L.ed. 1093 (1894). 
Moreover, judicial estoppel, like other forms of estoppel, includes an element of 
detrimental reliance and applies only as between those who are parties to the proceedings wherein 
the conduct allegedly giving rise to the estoppel occurred. The general principles which Limb 
attempts to invoke are set out in 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver §§68-71. Section 70 outlines 
the general limitations upon the application of such an estoppel. 
A number of limitations upon, or qualifications of, the rule against 
assuming inconsistent positions injudicial proceedings, have been laid 
down. Thus, the following have been enumerated as essentials to the 
establishment of an estoppel under the rule that a position taken in an 
earlier action estops the one taking such position from assuming an 
inconsistent position in a later action: (1) The inconsistent position 
first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment 
must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly 
inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the 
party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his 
3Photocopies of defendant Richard Tyler's draft letter and Smiths' revision are included in the 
Addendum. 
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position; and (6) it must appear unjust to one party to permit the other 
to change. 
The leading "judicial estoppel" case in Utah is Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw 
Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388 (1942). In that case, Tracy initiated the action for the purpose 
of determining the ownership of 638 shares of stock in Openshaw Investment Company. At trial, one 
Clarence R. Openshaw prevailed in his claim that he was the beneficial owner of said stock. On 
appeal, Tracy sought the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel noting that in his divorce 
proceedings, Openshaw had denied ownership of any property except a home on Ninth East Street 
in Salt Lake City and 50 shares of stock in Openshaw Investment Company. 
In affirming the judgment declaring Openshaw the owner of the 638 shares of stock 
in question, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The testimony of Clarence R. Openshaw in the divorce proceedings 
was almost diametrically opposite to his verified pleadings and 
testimony in the present case. In the present suit he testified that he 
paid over to the Openshaw Investment Company thousands of dollars 
and that he owned the 638 shares of stock in addition to the 50 shares, 
and that he furnished the major part of the property and securities 
which went into the company. His testimony was positive in both 
cases. In fact, the testimony indicates that he made his statements as 
to the purported facts carefully and deliberately. Counsel for appellant 
contends that inasmuch as he knew the facts all the time, he either 
perjured himself in the divorce action or in the case; and that the law 
does not permit a litigant to play fast and loose with the courts so as 
to give testimony because it is advantageous for him to do so. 
Appellant contends that the rule of "judicial estoppel" applies to bar 
Clarence R. Openshaw from asserting ownership of the 638 shares of 
stock issued to his father as trustee, for the reason his prior testimony 
amounts to a sworn declaration that he had no stock nor any interest 
in any stock except the 50 shares which he swore in 1932 he then no 
longer owned. 
The general rule of "judicial estoppel" or "estoppel by oath" is stated 
in 19 Am.Jur.712. Most of the decided cases hold that the rule may 
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be invoked only where the prior and subsequent litigation involves the 
same parties, and where one party has relied on the former testimony 
and changed his position by reason of it. In other words, a person 
may not, to the prejudice of another person deny any position taken 
in a prior judicial proceeding between the same persons or their privies 
involving the same subject-matter, if such prior position was 
successfully maintained. 
A majority of the cases hold that the party invoking the rule of 
estoppel must show that he has done something or omitted to do 
something in reliance upon the conduct of the other party by reason 
of which he will be prejudiced now if the facts are shown to be 
different from those on which he relied; but there is no estoppel where 
there was no reliance and the parties had equal knowledge of the facts. 
102 Utah, at 514-15 (citations omitted). 
Limb was not a party to the bankruptcy proceedings and cannot to claim an estoppel 
in his own right. Tylers had knowledge of the relevant facts and encouraged plaintiffs to ask the 
bankruptcy trustee to abandon the property so Tylers could sell it and pay plaintiffs the "overage." 
Tylers were not misled and are in no position to claim an estoppel. Indeed, when one considers the 
language of the letter which defendant Tyler drafted to "guide" plaintiffs,4 Tylers' claims of estoppel 
and waiver are almost laughable. See Addendum. 
In the district court, Limb relied upon Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980). 
Condas is not a judicial estoppel case. The legal issue in that case involved the admissibility of 
evidence. Defendants challenged the admission of evidence indicating that defendants' predecessor-
in-interest had filed an answer and counterclaim in previous litigation wherein the predecessor had 
4Richard Tyler testified in his deposition that he drafted a letter which included most of the 
language, and certainly all of the relevant terms which were incorporated into the letter by which 
Tylers now seek to estop plaintiffs. It is Mr. Tyler who acknowledges having drafted the letter to 
"guide" the plaintiffs. R 1229. 
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subject of the litigation. 
T
'
 1
 /s i eliance on Hill v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 829 P.2d 142 (Utah App. 
is likewise misplaced. Both these cases relate to an estoppel in the same proceeding involving the 
same parties and the same issues. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS' EQUITY OF REDEMPTION WAS I I J I 
RELINQUISHED BY POST-DEFAULT AGREEMENT. 
Ordinarily, an agreement to relinquish -.>. ^ nt\ of redemption must K h wiiiim: In 
B) >bei " i Situ u il, 112 I J1 , il 1 52. 189 I >.2< 1 118 (' ciendant : 
security for the money advanced, defendant's brother executed a wai ranty deed, absolute in lor;;*, A, 
favor of the defendant. The defendant then executed a document acknowledging that the deed was 
defendant's home. Defendant contended that during his convalescence defendant's brother expressed 
gratitude i ally reliev ed the defendant of 
any obligation of reconveying the property which he held as security, When the defendant's brother 
later contracted to sell tl ic properly to plaii rtiffs, defendant claimed to be the owner of the premises 
and an action was commenced to compel him to execute and deliver plaintiffs ^ . * r 
premises. 
/ • 1 I n i l l mi ml m i l l ! in l i i i lnl III il ill fend.ml'' hinlliii liiiil in hi I mill dj.'ieeil In 
surrender any interest he had in the property to the defendant but concluded that the agreement was 
unenforceable because it was not in writing. Defendant was ordered to execute a conveyance in favor 
of plaintiffs. Defendant appealed and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. This is the minority rule, 
see 65 A.L.R. 771, 777, but it is the Utah rule. 
The agreements upon which Limb relies to support his argument that plaintiffs 
relinquished their equity in the subject real property after they were in default include the June 13, 
1990, bankruptcy stipulation and the August 19, 1991, agreement which plaintiffs and defendants 
Tyler entered into just before Limb purchased the property. The former is in writing and signed. The 
latter was an oral agreement, but is enforceable to the extent plaintiffs acknowledge the agreement 
and its terms. See Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 621 (Utah 1984). 
Bankruptcy Stipulation. Limb contends that the bankruptcy stipulation constituted a relinquishment 
of plaintiffs' equity of redemption. The language of that stipulation made it clear that the objective 
of the stipulation was to fashion a method by which the property could be sold to a third party in an 
arms-length transaction thus generating money to pay the obligation owed Tylers and allowing 
plaintiffs (or their bankruptcy estate) "to receive the remaining proceeds or unsold property." Rather 
than constituting a relinquishment of plaintiffs' interest in this agreement is in fact a reaffirmation of 
that interest. Indeed, the agreement acknowledges plaintiffs' interest and states that plaintiffs will 
withdraw their claim in the future if the property is not sold or the obligation owed Tylers otherwise 
satisfied prior to March 1992. Limb purchased the subject property from Tylers in September 1991, 
long before the bankruptcy stipulation called for the relinquishment of plaintiffs' interest therein. 
August 1991 Agreement. On August 19, 1991, Tylers advised plaintiffs that Tylers had located a 
purchaser for the property and that in exchange for Tylers' agreement to pay plaintiffs the sum of 
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$20,000, plaintiffs agreed to relinquish their u 
Tylers' purchaser." Limb would have the court construe this oial contract as plaintiffs' agreement to 
immediately relinquish their interest in the subject real property . 
I lie wniri'il i nit . h] w him li I hi M U|M I ill i iiiilii im I mil ill nliliuaiiuiii in: lit'iiru'd pios idi 
that when the contract involves "an exchange of promises [which] can be rendered simultaneously, 
they i i that extent due simultaneously; unless tl le language oi the cii cumstances indicate the 
conti ary .' " Restatement Second, Contracts § 234. This rule "applies whenever [simultaneous] 
performance is possible, consistent with the terms of the contract," M, comment b. 
1 
promise to pay an agreed upon price provides the classic example of those contracts in which the 
,e appijes> $ee j( it C 0 | n|1: ieii;!: I , Illusti ations 1 thi ough 4. Q " Kimball v. Campbell , 
*, J^ v* . A (Utah 1985) (finding that parties intended that one party would execute and deliver lien 
release "as soon as" oilier party tendered agreed upon paymen nHd ^vbe*r written, agreement 
required release to be executed and delivei eel "foi 1:1 
paid on oi before date certain which was 22 days after the agreement was smned). 
^ requirement that the parties perform simultaneously where their 
performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises is 
fair for two reasons. First, it offers both parties maximum security 
aga inst disappointment of their expectations of a subsequent exchange 
of performances by allowing each party to defer his own performance 
until he has been assured that the other will perform. . . . Second, 
it avoids placing on either party the burden of financing the other 
before the latter has performed. Subsection (1) therefore imposes a 
requirement of simultaneous performance whenevei this is feasible 
under the contract, in the absence of language or circumstances 
indicating a contrary intention 
M., Rest.2d, comment a. 
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The application of general principles of contract law does not result in a construction 
of the August 19 agreement which instantaneously extinguishes plaintiffs' equity in the subject real 
property. For the agreement to so operate, it would have to be established that such was the intention 
of the parties. Such a finding would have to be made as a matter of fact. No such fact was 
established in the summary judgment proceedings and the case cannot be properly disposed of on that 
level. See Kimball, 699 P.2d, at 716. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT LIMB WAS ON CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF 
PLAINTIFFS' INTEREST. 
Constructive Notice Imparted by Smith's Possession. Possession of land is a fact which places 
all persons on inquiry as to the nature of the occupant's interest. See generally, 11 Am.Jur.2d, 
Vendor and Purchaser §671. In Tolandv. Cory, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190 (1890), the Utah Supreme 
Court held: 
We think the better doctrine is that an occupant's possession is actual 
notice of his title, and all persons with notice of such possession must 
at their peril take notice of his foil title in the premises, no difference 
what the records shows. Until the recording statutes were enacted, 
possession was notice of ownership, and a conveyance made by a 
party out of possession was void. The purpose of these statutes was 
not to change the rule that possession was evidence of title and notice 
to all the world of ownership, but to afford the means of preserving 
the chain of title, and give notice of the ownership of unoccupied 
lands. 
6 Utah, at 395. 
The possession must be open and visible and may be shown by any use of the land that 
indicates an intention to appropriate it to the benefit of the possessor. See generally, 11 Am.Jur.2d, 
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(1894) (harvesting crops from,, a portion of the land sufficient to give constructive notice* , 1^ 
question of whether or not an occupant's possession is sufficient to impute notice is one oi" tact Sec 
*?'""'' A"i IM" "V ' ']fi'in . W Vw " h*fsv ^l61"y 
In the instant case, plaintiffs continued to enjoy the possession of the subject property 
after 
comment regarding Smiths' continuing possession of the property: 
Q. [BY MR. PENDLETON] Okay. My question is, who had the right 
to the possession of this property after it had been deeded to you? 
MR. RUSSET.T' • Objeciu-: i aH * u* • •va< onclusion. 
MK. DUNL, ,>•, , •,;,-. • osked and answered. 
[MR. "i \ Lt-KJ ior.'i really understand what yoi i nieai i I didn't 
have anything on it. He [plaintiff Penn Smith] was usin' it and 
everything. 
Likewise, Mr. Smith testified that he continued to store personal property on the 
subject real estate and was continuing to use the real estate foi that purpose at the time > 
purchased the property. R 1056-57. Indeed, in questioning Smith, Limb's attorney had Smith identify 
a letter dated April 28, 1991, wherein Mr. Tyler nientions the personal property which Smiths w ere 
We are showing the properties to people or different parties at times 
and I think I should mention to you that whatever you have on these 
properties that you might w ant to keep should be removed or stored 
somwhere [sic] else. 
R1056, 1305,,. 
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Clearly, there is a factual issue as to whether or not plaintiffs' use of the subject real 
property was of such a nature as to cause any reasonable person to inquire about the extent of the 
interest which plaintiffs had or claimed in the land. Clearly, if Limb had entered upon the land as a 
trespasser and converted the scrap metal to his own use, he would have likely exposed himself to 
criminal liability for theft. Genuine issues preclude summary judgment. 
The district court concluded that "there can be no genuine issue of fact that scrap steel 
on vacant land does not constitute 'open, visible, and exclusive' possession that could give notice" 
that the person making such use of the property may claim some interest therein. R 665. This is not 
a conclusion of law. If this statement is of any legal significance, it is a finding of fact—one which is 
completely without evidentiary support. Indeed, all of the evidence in the record weighs against this 
proposition. 
Constructive Notice Imparted by Official Records. Limb acknowledges that he made no 
inspection of the record and was unaware of the existence or nature of any of the documents which 
an inspection of the record would have revealed. R 1158-59. The issue is not whether or not Limb 
justifiably relied upon the notice of abandonment but rather whether or not the recordation of such 
a document had any effect upon the title to the subject property as a matter of law, i.e., did the notice 
of abandonment place the world on constructive notice, and if so, notice what fact affecting title to 
the property? 
Without question, the extension and modification agreement recorded on November 
3, 1988, gave the world constructive notice of plaintiffs' interest in parcels 1, 2, and 3. Limb contends 
that the bankruptcy trustee's notice of abandonment was recorded prior to the recordation of Limb's 
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warranty deed and that any constructive notice ansifig In vnlur nl (lie exlonsinn .iinl inndilicutinn 
agreemnil WHS thereby extinguished as a matter of law. The record does not demonstrate that the 
notice of abandonment was recorded before Limb's warranty deed5,,, Even, if it was, it avails 1 imh 
in t i l l i n g . 
The language of I Jtah Code Ann §57-3-2 speaks in terms of notice being imparted 
by each document which has been, made a pai I of I he publm i u/oul I hut1 ;i iltn UMH nl n I in ii Ilium .iiiiiii 
effect upon title to real property is duly recorded, the effect of that document and the notice imparted 
thereby must be considered with and harmonized against all other documents affecting title to the 
same i]1 MM ell Niv y}eneni/lt\ Or V///v i" \l ran, K4 1l|, I , SSI, V7 I1 ?"<1 " " '( I lis <4)(pureh.'isei wilh 
notice of another's interest in u-al estate nus no! ^nndK reK ap-h ^presentations of persons other 
than claimant to . .^ . , . , . . mat claimant s intere ». 
The notice of abandonment 'was iniuaicu b> a i ^ , --! M*-n»;d -jy Tylers. It is in a 
a! created and uses language selected by Tvlers or person*"•• - -i o: itct^-e it was to advance 
1 denoted 
e format and prepared by the same author and. states that the banl • *.rtc\ trustee, whose signature 
appears thereafter, has "found the above lislcd pi opci t^  In mi il belong in il I in mli llliihn mil in I n i \\ IIIIIII 
of the bankruptcy estate, therefore burdensome to the estate, and of inconsequential or no value to 
the estate," 
Without qi lestion. , a bank.! i iptc> ti i istee does not !
 ;- \ - - adjudicate interests 
in real property. See generally , 9 Am Jur.2d, Bankruptcy §§289-315. When a bankruptcy trustee 
5The notice of abandonment was u-coided , *•• .ucmber •> ! 9M ^ : ai ., 4<, p m MD1 , as 
entry number 0390753 in Book 0618 at page 07^4 H i >u<-.-08. i ounsel is unable to locate in 
the record similar information relating u ; h \ eluding of Limb's warranty deed. 
abandons an asset, the asset reverts to the debtor and stands as if no bankruptcy petition had been 
filed. See Re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.). Indeed, an abandonment under 11 U.S.C. §554 
cannot be used as a means of effecting a transfer of title. See Re R-B-Co of Bossier, 59 BE. 43 (BC 
WD La 1986). 
Notwithstanding the recordation of the notice of abandonment, the notice imparted 
by the extension and modification agreement and plaintiffs' possession of the real property continued 
to put the world upon inquiry as to the nature and extent of the interest which plaintiffs' interest 
therein. The notice of abandonment was no more effective in extinguishing the notice imparted by 
the extension and modification agreement than any other instrument executed by a stranger to the title 
would have been. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
When plaintiffs initiated their action against Tylers without counsel, their theory of 
recovery was denominated as a claim for breach of contract. R 1. The theory was that Tylers had 
breached an agreement with plaintiffs by having sold property which plaintiffs had conveyed to Tylers 
as security. The complaint alleged that the property was sold for $75,000 under its fair market value 
and plaintiffs had been wrongfully deprived of their equity therein. R 1-2. In substance and effect, 
plaintiffs' initial complaint sounded more in property law than in contract law. 
After retaining counsel, a second amended complaint was filed which alleged that 
plaintiffs possessed an unforeclosed equity of redemption, an enforceable interest in the subject real 
property. R 386-87. The second amended complaint alleged a pure contract claim as second cause 
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of action, A • . * * . , . . • 
on the first and Urn d causes oiaai^i. If Tylers wouui ,.-i.. oi. tr<i unract and is hieaJi, piainntVs 
would be happy to abide by the agreement of August 19, 1991 If, on the other 1 land, the agreement 
\ , rmation, its terms, oi its enforceability, 
plaintiffs would be under ^ -;.nation J^ aha;..!.-', mat which they had agreed to relinquish in 
consideration oi me payment tney wen. 
Tylers answered the second amended complaint, they denied the allegations concerning the August 
19 agreement. R 404-05. 
V muiion, of course, did not 
address any claim, other than the first cause of action This was the only cause that involved the title 
to the subject real property •  - - •,' slulcd n'bttv II na1* lo ohtniii JI. 
order establishing that plaintiffs' equity of redemption had been e*tnmuished by estoppel, waive!, or 
operation of th** Utah Recording Act F ^41 \ ,nh argued that by the -.a. ,e :. , ^.LU 4 19 
agtc; lished their inter* -4 m the bubjeei real 
propertx R " c^ -<7 
•-. ••. Although there nuts iiuMiiiiiliiH! lii Iniii; llii uuiit linn iin untilt"ii siiiiiiiianh, di missing 
plaintiffs' second cause of action, the district court dismiss*' *•. of plaintiffs' claims with prejudice 
with the sole exception of plaint ills' I hud cause o\ a. M.<« Peking compensation for certain w ater 
rights iltry hrid transferred to defendant Tylers. Ro74. 
•, Plaintiflfe sought clarification of tht-oide'and received ,_"^ :^ T* W-77 . The court's 
final judgment cleanly Minliimul (Lit the, (ii>.li , ( i i I A il i i i i \ \Q mid i rinse 
0f action as part of the order entered on Ma> 2, J 995. R 7 J1. I'Jus was clearly reversible error on 
a procedural level. Moreover, the district court has never articulated any basis for concluding that 
plaintiffs not only lost their equity in the subject real property but failed to acquire an enforceable 
contract claim in the process. 
POINT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AND REFUSING TO SET THAT 
ORDER ASIDE UPON APPLICATION UNDER UTAH R.CIV.P. 
60(b). 
After the entry of the partial summary on May 2, 1995, Limb had but one legally 
recognized interest in the litigation that was still pending in the district court; pendency of plaintiffs' 
unadjudicated third cause of action prevented an appeal from the partial summary judgment thereby 
extending the cloud on the title which was created by the notice of lis pendens. See Hidden Meadows 
Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979). The time for taking that appeal would not begin to 
run until the remaining claim was either adjudicate on its merits or otherwise concluded or the partial 
summary judgment was certified under Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b). 
Notwithstanding the fact that Limb's attorney was aware that Mr. Dunlap had been 
negotiating a comprehensive settlement to which Limb himself had agreed to contribute to, counsel 
filed a motion on behalf of defendant Limb to dismiss the third cause of action for failure to prosecute 
and, in the alternative, to certify the partial summary judgment for immediate appeal. Either course 
of action would provide Limb with the only remedy which he was in a position to seek. 
Plaintiffs did not resist the Rule 54(b) certification. Indeed, plaintiffs had themselves 
sought certification of a partial summary judgment a year and a half earlier. Plaintiffs' attorney asked 
an associate to appear at the motion hearing and make sure that the district court understood that 
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plaintiffs did not resist ceilihutinii "Willi assurances hum lyleis' alloiney llul lhe\ would nul |um 
-m o r M g u e the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs' counsel left town on other business, confident that Limb 
would obtain the relief he sought with the certification and that no further action would be taken at 
III mi!11 i i i 1 , HI mi in mi 1 it, h e t i l i n g 
Once the district court had. certified the partial summary judgment, I inib had no 
further legal interest or standing in the litigation still pending in the district court For all intents and 
pi irposes, Limb was a strangei to that litigation. The only thing at stake in that proceeding was a 
claim for money damages asserted by plaintiffs against defendants Tyler,,, The pendency, abatement, 
termination of that : \ . 
other person ^a> n* t ,j < *. to the litiga Nevertheless IK W.J> A , wai to puisue the 
i,'wv.^ tK .. * « *.*.!;a*i.*t. i>*.J i «.vn gr.inuv • 
stipulation. 
The district court erred in allowing this,,, In so doing, the court entered an order which 
impact upon Linii* . < his legal interest* MoieoNet, tin court e\cv d me scoj_>. ui .he 
pendli.<. •/ w reqilfs; . ;..... -.^n i ; ; . - ; ^ 
Clearly a mal ^—;; acta, • - its *nitho; dy a, dismissing ca:>es involuntarily and on 
its own motion w hen litigants unreasonably delay the prosecution of a pending case,,, See Brasher 
Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown, <LJ uiah 2u ~ 
logically, follow that the court may do so without, giving notice of its intention, to order dismissal on, 
"p I i I1 M' .w"l > nil ' > • ". n. 
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Moreover, a trial court errors in dismissing, either upon its own motion or the motion 
of an adverse party, litigation which has been reasonably pursued in ways which might not be 
apparent in the record of the court. Specifically, it has been held an abuse of discretion for a court 
to dismiss a plaintiffs claim with prejudice for failure to prosecute where a 16-month lapse in activity 
in the court's record was attributable to the fact that settlement negotiations were ongoing and 
defendants had not requested that the matter be reset for pretrial conference or trial. See Utah Oil 
Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977). 
"The law has no interest in compelling all disputes to be resolved by litigation. One 
reason public policy favors the settlement of disputes by compromise, is that this avoids the delay and 
the public and private expense of litigation." Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com 'n, 658 
P.2d 601, 613 (Utah 1983)(citations omitted). Indeed, compromise and settlement advances social 
interests which are seldom addressed in the context of adversarial proceedings. See generally 15A 
Am.Jur.2d, Compromise and Settlement §5. 
In considering a motion to involuntarily dismiss the pending action, the trial court 
should consider the conduct of all parties to the litigation and consider the opportunity each has had 
to move the case forward, what each has done in this regard and what, if any, prejudice has been 
caused by dilatory tactics of ones adversaries. See Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). 
In the instant case, the parties had been engaged in settlement negotiations. No one 
had requested a trial setting or otherwise sought to advance the controversy in the context of the 
litigation. The district court could not have reasonably concluded that plaintiffs needed to be 
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censured I* .-r not pursuing litigation rather than neg( itiatioi i Cf.. h )hfu mx I // eb? < mc i ', ! - • • " 5 ; 1 I \2\ 1 
Plaintiffs have attempted to move this controversy forward to a final resolution 
iiliiini^ li lidgafiuii tippctl iiihl i iiii|iiiiiiiii >i n1. (In i in iimstan.rs dh liitnl''I mil \\\\\xv other hand, 
apparently because he is so firmly convinced of the strength of his position, has repeatedly sought the 
summary dismissal of plaintiffs claims on the merits oi w\\\ nlhri basis tvhiili M'tnial lu IMM 
presented itself on the record as it appeared or as Limb was able to make it appear. He has not 
participated in settlement negotiations and has, again apparently as a result of what he perceives to 
of court Moreover, he ha s resisted plaintiffs' elicits •- v-\* w tiv- lit mat ion . * a hnal resolution. 
resisting Rule 54(b) certifier : when plaintihs attempts 
plaintiffs' third cause of action for failure to prosecute approximately seven months after securing the 
dismissal of plaintiffs' appeal alleging nothing had been done »• tu~ ense f^*- ~ver ^ months. He 
an alternative and resisted efforts to have that order of dismissal set iside Fmaliv, 1 rnnh resisted the 
inclusion of the parties' depositions as part of the record on appeal, iiini vylhslaiiditig the lad llu! l\\v 
merits of this case cannot be fairly determined without them. 
6Given the inter-relationship between the factual predicate underlying all three causes of 
action and more particularly, the second and third causes, plaintiffs though it expedient to seek 
appellate review of the dismissal of the first two causes before spending the time and resources 
necessary to litigate the orphaned third cause of action 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that genuine issues of fact 
preclude the summary judgment of real property title issues and issues related to enforcement of the 
contract claims which have been asserted as an alternative to establishing plaintiffs' interests in the 
real property. Moreover, the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' third cause and in denying 
the motion to set aside that order of dismissal. Accordingly, the orders and judgments of the district 
court should be reversed in their entirety and the case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of February, 1998. 
IS/ 
GARY W. PENDLETON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this 13th day of February, 1998,1 did personally mail two 
true and correct copies of the above and foregoing document to: 
Ronald G. Russell Ronald Truman 
Attorney for Limb Attorney for Tylers 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 923 S. River Road, Suite 201 
P. O. Box 11019 St. George, Utah 84790 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
I 51 
Gary W. Pendleton 
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ADDENDUM 
February 9th, 1991 
Mr. Dwane K. Gillman 
Mr. & Mrs. R. H. Tyler 
C. C. Judith A. Boulden, Judge 
When v/e filed for a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, upon the 
advice of our Lawyer Raiph Petty, we made a mistake 
and included four parcels of property that we had 
deeded to the Tyler's in 1987. These were collateral 
for loans that we made from the Tyler's. 
Under the terms of the Loans we made from the Tyler's 
we deeded with Warrantee Deeds to the Tyler's the prop-
erties with the understanding that if v/e did not pay the 
payments and Property Taxes and late charges on time the 
properties would automatically be the Tyler's. //e have 
been unable to repay the Tyler's under the terms of the 
Motes, Agreements and the properties rightfully belong 
to the Tyler'si about a year before chapter 11 took place. 
At the time of filing chapter 11, we were in default on 
all three accounts mentioned above for more than a year. 
We knew the properties rightfully belonged to the Tylers 
but upon suggestion by the lawyer we entered them in the 
bankruptcy. In all fairness under the terms of the Loans 
this should never have been done. They belong to the Tyler's. 
We now believe that the advice v/e received from Mr. Petty 
to include the Tylers property in our Bankruptcy was bad 
advice and that they should be released to the Tyler's as 
they really own them and have for about a year before the 
original filing of the chapter 11. 
Please let this letter be our request to release the properties 
to the Tyler's who should never have been a part of this to 
begin with. 
This Bankruptcy should not be used to hurt Older People like 
the Tyler's that tried to help us, when we needed help. 
Also, Security Title people here in St. George would testify 
to this being the truth." Letter enclosed. 
These properties have been for sale for 6 or 7 years. There is 
no reason to continue longer. Please release them and let the 
Tyler's try to recover there losses. 
Thank you, 
DEPOSITION | PENN H. SMITH 
EXHIBIT 
I 
I 
I ^ ^ 9 I MARY ANNE SMITH 
February 11, 1091 
To: Mr. Dwayne H. Gillman 
Mr. & Mrs. E. H. Tyler 
When we f i l e d for a chapter 11 Bankruptcy, upon t h e 
adv ice of our lawyer Ralph Pe t ty , V6 made a mistake and 
inc luded fdur pa rce l s of property t ha t we had deeded t o t h e 
T y l e r s in 1987. „ These were c o l l a t e r a l for two loans t h a t we 
maae from €he Tylers . 
Under t h e terms of t h e loans we made from t h e Tylers^, 
we deeded the p r o p e r t i e s with Warranty Deeds t o t h e Tylers , 
wi th t h e understanding t h a t i f we did*not/ pay t h e payments, 
propeirty t a x e s and l a t e charges on time the p r o p e r t i e s would 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y be t h e Tylers . We have been unable t o repay t h e 
T y l e r s under t h e terms of t he notes and agreements and the 
p r o p e r t i e s r i g h t f u l l y belonged t o the Tylers about a year bef or 
we f i l e d our chapter 11. 
At t h e t ime of f i l i n g our chapter 11 we bad been in 
d e f a u l t f o r more than a year and the proper t ies r i g h t f u l l y 
belonged t o the Tylers hu t upon the advice of our lawyer he 
inc luded them in the bankruptcy. This should have never been 
done. 
He now know t h a t t h e advice we recieved from Mr. P e t t y 
t o inc lude theese p rope r t i e s in our bankruptcy was bad advice 
f o r we r e a l l y had no claim t o them. Please l e t t h i s l e t t e r be 
our r e q u e s t t o r e l e a s e the p roper t i e s out of our bankruptcy. 
Also t h e r e i s a l e t t e r from Security T i t l e concuring in 
t h e opit l lcn .:;h*t ve have £^ fur thur claim upon t h e s e 
proporrtiots .* 
c/^_ . _ 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PENN HARRIS SMITH, 
MARY ANNE SMITH, and 
E.P.S. DEVELOPMENT, 
a Utah partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
RICHARD H. TYLER, INA W. 
TYLER, and RUSSELL J. LIMB, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION and 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT LIMB'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920501015 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
This matter came before the court on March 27, 1995 for 
hearing on Defendant Limb's Motion for Summary Judgment dated 
March 7, 1995. Ronald G. Russell appeared on behalf of defendant 
Russell J. Limb. Gary W. Pendleton appeared on behalf of 
plaintiffs. Craig S. Dunlap appeared on behalf of defendants 
Richard H. Tyler and Ina W. Tyler. Steven D. Burge appeared on 
behalf of third-party defendant Security Title Company of 
Southern Utah. Based on the record in this matter, including the 
pleadings and evidence on file with the court, and the arguments 
of counsel, the court renders the following opinion and order. 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint seeks a determination 
that plaintiffs hold an equity of redemption in certain real 
properties purchased by defendant Limb from defendants Russell H. 
( (ft 
Tyler and Ina W. Tyler ("Tylers"). Plaintiffs claim that 
warranty deeds by which title to the properties was conveyed to 
the Tylers were actually equitable mortgages and that plaintiffs' 
equity of redemption arising from those warranty deeds was never 
extinguished through foreclosure. Defendant Limb has moved for 
summary judgment on three grounds: (1) plaintiffs are judicially 
estopped from asserting an equity of redemption because of their 
specific disclaimer of any interest in the subject properties in 
prior bankruptcy proceedings; (2) plaintiffs cannot enforce an 
equity of redemption against defendant Limb who was a bona fide 
purchaser for value from the Tylers and, therefore, protected by 
the Utah Recording Act; and (3) the claimed equitable mortgages 
were abrogated by specific agreements between plaintiffs and the 
Tylers. 
1. Judicial Estoppel. 
Under Utah law, judicial estoppel prevents a party who has 
taken a position in prior litigation and has obtained relief on 
the basis of it from maintaining the opposite position in another 
action. Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980); see 
also Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 829 
P.2d 142, 148 n.4 (Utah App. 1992). 
In this case, plaintiffs specifically took the position in 
their prior bankruptcy case that they claimed no interest in the 
2 
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subject properties and that the properties belonged to the 
Tylers, The court finds that it is undisputed that on or about 
February 11, 1991, plaintiffs wrote a letter to Duane H. Gillman, 
the United States Bankruptcy Trustee, in which plaintiffs 
specifically represented to the bankruptcy trustee that they 
claimed no interest in the subject properties. See Depo. Ex. 15; 
P. Smith Depo. p. 86. Along with the February 11, 1991 letter, 
plaintiffs filed with the bankruptcy court an Ex Parte Motion to 
Release Real Property in which plaintiffs again represented that 
they claimed no interest in the properties. See Depo. Ex. 16; P. 
Smith Depo. pp. 94-95. Further, plaintiff Penn Harris Smith 
testified at his recent deposition that the reason such 
representations were made to the bankruptcy court was so that the 
properties would be released from the bankruptcy to enable the 
Tylers to sell the properties. See P. Smith Depo. pp. 95, 
100-101. 
The court further finds that it is undisputed that the 
bankruptcy trustee acted upon the representations of plaintiffs 
and their request that the property be released and signed a 
Notice of Abandonment in which the trustee found and concluded 
that plaintiffs had no interest or claim to the subject 
properties. See Affidavit of Duane H. Gillman 5151 5, 6. The 
Tylers relied on plaintiffs' disclaimer of any interest in the 
3 
properties so they could be sold and warranted title to the 
properties to defendant Limb pursuant to a Warranty Deed. Tylers 
and their successor in title, defendant Limb, would be prejudiced 
if plaintiffs are not estopped from disavowing the position taken 
in the prior bankruptcy proceedings. 
Because defendant Limb is in privity of estate with the 
Tylers, having received his title to the subject properties by 
way of a deed from the Tylers, defendant Limb is entitled to 
invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel. See Condas v. Condas, 
618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980) (holding that judicial estoppel "is 
applicable to defendants here, as successors in interest of the 
real property involved in both cases"). 
2. Utah Recording Act. 
Under Utah law, an unrecorded conveyance is "void as against 
any subsequent purchaser of the same real property" where the 
subsequent purchaser "purchased the property in good faith and 
for valuable consideration" and his conveyance is recorded first. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3 (1994). A bona fide purchaser for value 
entitled to the protection of the recording act is "one who takes 
without actual or constructive knowledge of facts sufficient to 
put him on notice of the complainant's equity." Blodgett v. 
Martsh, 590 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978). 
4 
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The court finds that it is undisputed that defendant Limb 
had no actual knowledge that plaintiffs claimed an interest in 
the properties prior to his purchase and the recordation of the 
deed conveying title to him. In addition, based on the 
undisputed facts, defendant Limb did not have constructive notice 
of plaintiffs' claimed equity of redemption prior to the 
recordation of his deed. Before the Warranty Deed from Tylers to 
Limb was recorded, the bankruptcy trustee's Notice of Abandonment 
was recorded. The Notice of Abandonment specifically stated that 
the debtors (plaintiffs Penn H. Smith and Mary Anne Smith) had no 
interest in the subject properties. There is no evidence that 
defendant Limb examined the county records prior to his purchase. 
However, if defendant Limb had examined the record, he would have 
found the recorded Notice of Abandonment from the bankruptcy 
trustee. Any inquiry to the bankruptcy trustee would have 
resulted in defendant Limb learning that the bankruptcy trustee's 
conclusion was based on plaintiffs' specific disclaimer of any 
interest in the properties. See Affidavit of Duane H. Gillman 55 
5, 6. Defendant Limb would have no duty to disbelieve the 
bankruptcy trustee's conclusion or to aggressively investigate 
and set the record straight. See Diversified Equities v. 
American Savings and Loan Association, 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
5 
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Plaintiffs argue that constructive notice can also be given 
by possession and assert that there are disputed fact issues 
regarding plaintiffs7 possession of the properties. Under Utah 
law, "actual possession . . . when open, visible, and exclusive, 
will put upon inquiry those acquiring any title to or a lien upon 
the land so occupied. . . . " Mathis v. Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 
P.2d 952, 959 (1953). The only evidence of possession submitted 
by plaintiffs is the testimony of plaintiff Penn H. Smith that 
there were certain items of "junk" including "scrap steel and 
things of that nature" on what was otherwise vacant property. 
See P. Smith Depo. p. 103. The court concludes that there can be 
no genuine issue of fact that scrap steel on vacant land does not 
constitute "open, visible, and exclusive" possession that could 
give constructive notice of a claim against title. 
3. Abrogation of Equitable Mortgages. 
Even if the court were to assume that the absolute warranty 
deeds given to the Tylers by plaintiffs were intended to be 
equitable mortgages, the parties may subsequently abrogate a 
conditional mortgage by agreement. 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages § 
520, at 508 (1971). Plaintiffs themselves in this case have 
alleged at least two separate agreements that abrogated the 
claimed equitable mortgages. First, plaintiffs and the Tylers 
entered into a stipulation in connection with plaintiffs' 
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bankruptcy case that provided that the properties would be sold 
free of any claim of plaintiffs with excess proceeds to be paid 
to the bankruptcy court. Upon execution of that stipulation, 
plaintiffs agreed that they no longer had an equity of redemption 
and that their bankruptcy estate would only have an interest in 
the proceeds of a sale. Second, plaintiffs allege in their 
Second Amended Complaint, in affidavits filed in this case, and , 
in deposition testimony that on August 19, 1991 plaintiffs agreed 
to permit Tylers to sell the properties free of plaintiffs' 
claims. fSee P. Smith Depo. pp. 80-84; Affidavit of Penn H. 
Smith dated April 28, 1994 at 5 11; Second Amended Complaint 5 
14.] Plaintiffs assert that the statute of frauds would operate 
to prevent the enforcement of their August 19, 1991 agreement to 
permit the properties to be sold. The court concludes, however, 
that by admitting the existence of such an agreement in the 
pleadings, the plaintiffs have waived any statute of frauds 
defense. See Bentlev v.- Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 621 (Utah 1984). 
For the foregoing reasons and for the additional reasons 
identified in the memoranda submitted by the Tylers in support of 
their motion for summary judgment, the court concludes that there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and that defendant Limb is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Limb's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is hereby granted. The court will enter a 
judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint as 
against defendant Limb, thereby adjudicating that plaintiffs have 
no claim to the subject properties and awarding costs as provided 
by law. 
DATED th is v ' day of ( JL 
BY THE COURT: 
, 1995, 
J7/lPhilip EV6 
[^ strict Court Judge 
IJSI 
Certificate of Mailing or Hand Delivery 
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150 North 200 East 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PENN HARRIS SMITH, MARY ANNE 
SMITH, AND E.P.S. DEVELOPMENT, 
a Utah partnership 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD H. TYLER, INA W. 
TYLER, and RUSSELL J. LIMB, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD H. TYLER 
and 
INA W. TYLER, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF 
SOUTHERN UTAH, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Third Party Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION and 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS 
RICHARD AND INA TYLERS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920501015 
This matter came before the court on March 27, 1995 for 
hearing on Defendants Richard and Ina Tyler's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Ronald G. Russell appeared for Defendant Russell Limb. 
Gary Pendleton appeared for Plaintiffs. Craig S. Dunlap appeared 
for Defendants Richard and Ina Tyler. Steven D. Burge appeared for 
Third-party Defendant Security Title Company of Southern Utah. 
l*&A 
Based upon the documents before the court and the 
arguments of counsel the court issues the following opinion and 
order. 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint seeks enforcement of 
plaintiffs alleged right of redemption in certain real property 
sold by Defendants Tyler to Defendant Limb. Plaintiffs assert that 
said property was deeded to the Tylers as part of a loan 
transaction and that their rights of redemption were not properly 
extinguished through foreclosure. 
Defendants Richard and Ina Tyler move for summary 
judgment on the grounds of judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, 
and waiver. 
FACTS1 
1. In November of 198> the Smiths filed for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 11. 
2. In their bankruptcy filing the Smiths claimed an 
interest to the subject property and listed Richard and Ina Tyler 
as creditors. 
3. On June 13, 1990, the Smiths and Tylers signed a 
Stipulation regarding their interests in the subject property. 
4. The Stipulation was drafted by Plaintiffs' attorney 
and required Bankruptcy Court approval. 
5. On August 1, 1990, Judge Judith A. Boulden signed an 
Order, drafted by Plaintiffs' attorney, approving the Stipulation. 
^Additional facts are set forth in this Court's Order granting 
Defendant Russell Limb's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
6. On February 11, 1991, Plaintiffs wrote a letter to 
the U.S. Trustee in Bankruptcy, Duane Gillman. Plaintiffs stated 
that listing the property in the bankruptcy proceeding was a 
"mistake" and requested that the property be released from the 
bankruptcy. See Depo. Ex. 15; P. Smith Depo. p. 86. 
7. In addition to their letter Plaintiffs signed an "Ex 
Parte Motion to Release Real Property" in which Plaintiffs assert 
that the Tylers "should be granted the relief of regaining the 
control of their property." See Depo. Ex. 16; P. Smith Depo. pp. 
94-95. 
8. It is clear from the documents in the record and 
Plaintiff's testimony that Penn Smith wanted the property released 
from the Bankruptcy Court. See F Smith Depo. pp. 95, 100-101. 
9. On August 23, 1991, The U.S. Trustee in Bankruptcy, 
Duane Gillman signed a Notice of Abandonment regarding the subject 
property. The Notice stated that the Smiths had no interest in the 
subject property and that there was no objection or request for a 
hearing regarding the abandonment. See Affidavit of Duane Gillman 
at UK 5-6. 
10. Duane Gillman relied on Plaintiffs representations 
in abandoning the property. See Affidavit of Duane Gillman at f 6. 
A. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL. 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel. Judicial estoppel prevents a party from taking a 
position in litigation, obtaining relief on it, and then changing 
that position in subsequent litigation. Gee Cicadas v. Condas, 613 
P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980); see also Hill v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co. 829 P.2d 142 (Utah App. 1992). 
In this case Plaintiffs clearly took the position in the 
Bankruptcy proceeding that they had no interest in the property. 
As a direct result of Plaintiffs taking this position the property 
was abandoned by the Bankruptcy Trastee. Now that the property is 
no longer subject to the claims of creditors in Federal Bankruptcy 
Court Plaintiffs seek to bring an action in this Court. If this 
were permitted there would be nothing to stop future debtors from 
disavowing any interest they may have to their property while in 
Bankruptcy proceedings, and then later coming into State Court and 
asserting the interest they previously disavowed. This cannot be 
tolerated and is the reason judicial estoppel is applied by the 
Courts. 
B. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel also bars Plaintiffs' 
claims. In Utah the four elements of equitable estoppel are: 
(1) a statement, admission, act or failure to 
act by one party inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted; (2) reasonable action or 
inaction by the other party taken on the basis 
of the first parties statement, admission, act 
or failure to act; (3) injury to the second 
party that WOUJ d result from allowing the 
first to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act or failure to act. 
Holland v. Career Service Review Bd. , 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 
1993) . 
In this case Plaintiffs made clear unequivocal statements 
i -7;. 
to the Tylers, the Bankruptcy Trustee, and to the Federal 
Bankruptcy Court that Plaintiffs had no claim to the disputed 
properties. Furthermore, the Tylers and the Bankruptcy Trustee 
reasonably relied on those statements. Allowing Plaintiffs to 
assert a claim to the property that is contradictory to the 
position they held during the bankruptcy proceedings would be 
detrimental to Defendants. Plaintiffs therefore, are equitably 
estopped from asserting their claims. 
C. WAIVER. 
Plaintiffs waived their claims against Defendants. A 
waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Co., Inc., 831 P. 2d 130 (Utah 
App. 1992) . The intent to relinquish a right can be implied from 
conduct if the conduct unequivocally evinces an intent to waive or 
is at least inconsistent with any other intent. B. R. Woodward 
Mktg., v. Collins Food Serv. Inc., 754 P.2d 99 (Utah App. 1988). 
Plaintiffs affirmatively stated that they had no claim to 
the disputed properties. Plaintiffs actions indicate an intent to 
abandon any claim to the properties and are inconsistent with any 
other position. Plaintiffs have therefore, waived their right to 
assert any claim to the properties which are the subject of this 
action. 
D. CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons stated above and the additional reasons 
presented by the various Defendants in their briefs, this court 
concludes that summary judgment is appropriate. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants Richard and Ina 
Tylers Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Plaintiffs' 
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to all claims regarding 
the subject property. Plaintiffs claims regarding the water rights 
are reserved. 
DATED THIS $-1 4 day of 
BY THE^COURT 
, 1995, 
J . /KhilTip E^ms>; 
D i s t r i c t . Cour&-Judge 
Certificate of Mailing or Hand Delivery 
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postage pre-paid to the following, or placed the copies in counsel's folder: 
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150 North 200 East 
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Craig S. Dunlap, Esq. 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, UT 84770 
Steven D. Burge, Esq. 
P. O. Box 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0726 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. 
P. O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0019 
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Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (A4134) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Attorneys for Defendant Russell J. Limb 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PENN HARRIS SMITH, MARY ANNE 
SMITH, and E.P.S. DEVELOPMENT, a 
Utah partnership, 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
RICHARD H. TYLER, INA W. TYLER, ; 
and RUSSELL J. LIMB, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) FINAL JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 920501015 
) Judge J. Philip Eves 
This matter came before the court on September 23, 1996 on Defendant Limb's 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution or, Alternatively, to Certify Partial Summary 
Judgment as Final. Ronald G. Russell appeared on behalf of Russell J. Limb ("Limb"). 
Michael B. Hughes appeared on behalf of Richard H. Tyler and Ina W. Tyler ("Tylers"). 
Douglas D. Terry appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. Based on the record in this matter, 
the court having determined to grant said motion, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. For the reasons set forth in the court's Memorandum Opinions dated April 27, 
1995 granting the summary judgment motions of defendants Limb and Tylers, the plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety and with prejudice as against Limb, 
and the First and Second Causes of Action in the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint are 
dismissed with prejudice as against Tylers. 
2. The court hereby adjudicates and declares that plaintiffs have no right, title, 
equity, lien, or interest in the following-described real property located in Washington 
County, Utah: 
PARCEL 1: 
All of Lot 19 of the CANYON BREEZE R. V. RESORT, according 
to the Official Plat thereof, recorded in the Office of the County 
Recorder of said County. 
PARCEL 2: 
All of Lot 45 of the CANYON BREEZE R. V. RESORT, according 
to the Official Plat thereof, recorded in the Office of the County 
Recorder of said County. 
PARCEL 3: 
Beginning at a point North 89°15'05" East 769.50 feet, along the 
Section line from the Northwest Corner of the Northeast Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter of Section 20, Township 42 South, Range 15 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 00°37' 
East, 356.17 feet; thence North 89023, East 202.37 feet; thence North 
00°37' West, 189.02 feet; thence North 51°03'56" West, 262.49 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
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PARCEL 4: 
Beginning at a point North 89°23' East 611.05 feet along the 40 line 
and North 00°37' West 260.00 feet from the Southwest Corner of the 
Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 20, Township 
42 South, Range 15 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence North 00°37' West 438.46 feet; thence South 89°23' West 
43.00 feet; thence North 00°37' West 150.0 feet; thence South 
38°04'36" West 179.63 feet; thence South 00°36' East 349.82 feet; 
thence South 29°25'44M East 114.13 feet; thence North 89°23' East 
99.06 feet to the point of beginning. 
3. The Third Cause of Action in plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is dismissed 
as against Tylers for lack of prosecution. 
4. For the reasons set forth in the court's Order Granting Third-Party Defendant 
Security Title's Motion for Summary Judgment dated May 31, 1995, the Third-Party 
Complaint of Tylers is dismissed with prejudice. 
5. The court grants judgment in favor of Limb and against plaintiffs in the amount 
of costs of this action totaling $ . 
6. The court grants judgment in favor of Tylers and against plaintiffs in the amount 
of costs of this action totaling $ . 
7. The court grants judgment in favor of third-party defendant Security Title 
Company and against Tylers in the amount of costs of this action totaling $ . 
8. The court having adjudicated all claims in this action and finding no just reason 
for delay hereby certifies this judgment as a final judgment. 
3 
DATED this day of October, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable J. Philip Eves 
District Court Judge 
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4. I hereby certify that on the / day of October, 1996 a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Michael D. Hughes, Esq. 
Craig S. Dunlap, Esq. 
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187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Thomas M. Higbee, Esq. 
Steven D. Burge, Esq. 
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